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Purpose: This study looked at youth protest as a catalyst for social change in enhancing good 
governance in South Africa. The aftermath of apartheid presented South Africa scouring for 
good governance. The successive governments constantly restructured social and economic 
sectors through policy implementation and ambitious programs to promote good governance. 
Yet, there has been numerous demonstrations and protests reminiscing the days of the anti-
apartheid struggle, particularly towards the quality of service delivery provided. Methodology: 
The paper is a qualitative study, which employed eclectic literature in analysing the role of 
youth protest towards the promotion of good governance in South Africa. Findings: The study 
discussed the reason for the occurrence of youth protest in South Africa, as well as how it could 
promote good governance is strategically managed. Implication: The study emphasizes the 
catalytic role protests play as social change in enhancing good governance. Originality: So 
far, no available study has identified youth protest as a catalyst for social change in enhancing 
good governance in South Africa. Conclusion: It was recommended that government should 
include and involve more youths in integral processes like constitutionalism, rule of law and 
leadership roles. 
 
















The study attempt to understand the role of the youth in protest as a catalyst for social change 
in enhancing good governance in South Africa. The aftermath of apartheid presented South 
Africa scouring for good governance, as the enormous desires for a state were to have greater 
access to basic public services, as functions of democracy and good governance. However, the 
apartheid’s legacy raised immense obstacles to emerging South Africa in 1994, including a 
high poverty rate and social inequality (Enaifoghe, 2018). This, therefore, tasked the new 
democratic government to begin with tackling the identified challenges by enshrining 
legitimate rights to access services, restructuring both social and economic sectors, through 
policy implementation and supporting ambitious programs for service delivery (Enaifoghe, 
2018).  
 
The Government embarked on a  program to promote social cohesion to resolve the high level 
of violent crime that characterizes society and promote positive national identity in a diverse, 
heterogeneous, racialized and stratified community (Seekings, 2000, Nthambeleni 2009). In 
addressing the effect of violent crime on emerging forms of society, Pillay (2008: 4), states that 
the actions of post-apartheid communities display a tendency towards division “rather than 
unification, undermining the efforts of 'nation-building”. For instance,  the second decade of 
South African democracy shows an explosion of widespread demonstrations, a rise in protest 
and violence reminiscent of the days of the anti-apartheid struggle. In the first quarter of 2014, 
statistics revealed that Gauteng has witnessed more than 500 demonstrations, with over 100 
been violent (South African History Online, 2014). Ironically, the majority of the protests 
constitutes the youths.  
 
To Enaifoghe and Adetiba (2019) youths constitute a large fraction of the Africa population, 
South Africa inclusive. According to a mid-year population report by STATS SA in 2019, 
estimated youths (ages 18-34) constitute one-third of the population (Stats SA, 2019). 
However, with a large fraction of these numbers unemployed and feeling marginalized 
(Maganga, 2020; Stats SA, 2020), the youths have resorted to protests and demonstrations. 
This is to change political systems and leaders that are perceived to be incompetent and 
responsible for the daily suffering of the people. For instance, the Soweto uprising of 1976, the 
protest against an increase in University fees under the #feesmustfallmovement.  
 
Lekalake (2016), an average young South African sees the country’s leadership as inaccessible 
and desires to hold the elected leaders accountable. On this note, the study will be examining 
how youth protest can enhance good governance in South Africa.  To get a detailed insight, the 
study will be answering questions such as: Why does youth protest occur in South Africa? How 
can it enhance good governance in South Africa? This paper is structured into four sections 
with section one presenting the introduction and the method adopted, section two looks at the 
literature consideration. Section three present the theory used in the study, the section presents 
the discussion of findings and concluding remarks 
Research Methodology 
The study adopted a qualitative research method based on a wide range of literature sources. 
This includes relevant articles, reports, books, and internet sources. The search for information 
was streamlined from 2014 to 2020. However, exceptions were made to years before 2014 
based on the information gotten and its relevance to the study. According to Enaifoghe (2020: 
114), the method permits “researchers to access over 200 literature through advance search and 
streamline them with themes and keywords to determine the relevance of the documents that 
they consult based on their significance to the study”. 
 
Literature Consideration 
South Africa has since 1994 experienced several movements of home protests resulting in an 
uprise of the less privileged, demanding service delivery and good governance. The issue of 
protest has been prevalent and sometimes intense, getting to a dissatisfied proportion in some 
cases (Alexander, 2012). The government, established by the African National Congress 
(ANC), encountered socio-political and economic instability that is embodied in an assortment 
of demonstrations that are degrading at the metropolitan level. The various demonstration and 
protests were linked to poor service delivery at the municipal level (Alexander, 2010). 
Enaifoghe (2019a), argued that there is increased service delivery protests were associated with 
economic downturns, dual recessionary strains, and the rising level of unemployment in the 
country. The above argument was confirmed by Enaifoghe and Adetiba (2019a), as seen on the 
grounds of the public demands to establish work opportunities or the despondency with the 
distribution of tenders and workers by the unemployed group.  
 
Nirhsa (2012), concluded that although dissatisfied people may have legitimate reasons to do 
so protests on service delivery is viewed as having a detrimental effect on government services, 
companies, consumer trust and employment. The ongoing service delivery protests, as 
suggested by Patel (2013), is viewed as a counterproductive tactic for territories more 
vulnerable to them, mainly communities situated in the peri(urban) areas. This has been 
illustrated as municipal infrastructure delivery strikes have demolished various schools which 
have impacted the standard of teaching and schooling (Vuwani in Limpopo province is a 
typical example) (Enaifoghe, 2019b). These marches negatively affect businesses when they 
are commandeered by lawbreakers who breaks in to plunder shops, driving organisations to 
block their entryways (Du Preez, 2014). Moreover, market opportunities for development are 
diminishing with the loss of many days of strikes around the world.  
 
The devastating effect of “service delivery protests” do not improve investor’s faith, it rather 
decreases or dent South Africa's image as an investment destination and can also adversely 
impact tourism arrivals. Given the above-identified issues associated with protest in South 
Africa, quite several critics have attributed poor service personnel to the proliferation of violent 
protest in South Africa, to failure in service delivery at the municipal level, low productivity 
and poor communication (Alexander 2010; Ngwane 2010; Booysen 2009a).  Scholars like 
Enaifoghe and Adetiba (2018) and Vally (2009), argued that high poverty, youth 
unemployment, low citizen involvement in “decision-making systems and lack of access to 
information”, while Matebesi (2011), stated that poverty and unemployment sparked 
allegations of partiality, collusion and negligence by authorities. Pithouse (2009: 251) claims 
that the “official State discourse, scholars and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
including human rights campaigners and NGOs, more or less unanimously defines these 
demonstrations as 'service delivery protests”.  
 
It is the authors’ view that public outcry is mostly perceived as attacking domestic municipal 
councils believed to be the reason for failed delivery of public services. Several researchers 
such as Alexander (2010); Ngwane (2010); Sinwell et al. (2009); Vally (2009); Booysen 
(2009a), indicated that protest activity usually stems from an increasing amount of study, in 
addition to a range of diverse, mostly subjectively-based protest data collection initiatives in 
South Africa.  
Debate and Trends of Youth Protest in South Africa 
The debates around protests resulting from failure in service delivery are seen to be the most 
common form of protest in South Africa. These protests and demonstrations are launched are 
often led by youth, who mainly resides in townships (Matebesi, 2011), as well as the civil 
society campaigns, personally-motivated and local communities and immigrants (Akinboade, 
Mokwena and Kinfack 2013; Hough 2008). Accordingly, the failed service delivery 
demonstrations experienced in South Africa are marked by large gatherings. They also include 
“memoranda writing, motions, 'toy-toys,' parade, stay-aways, referendum boycotts, roadblock, 
burning of tires, plundering, smashing houses (Enaifoghe and Adetiba, 2019b). The protests 
also involve the chasing of ostracised people in the townships, clashes with “the police and 
forced resignations of elected officials” (Akinboade et al. 2013:467; Alexander 2010:26; 
Sebugwawo 2011).  
 
There are only a few published studies on failed “service delivery protests in South Africa”, 
however, the available pieces of literature are mostly subjective and briefing by the mass 
media, rather than concepts that emanate from observational data. This is evident as the 
Municipal IQ (2019), registered the highest number of “failed service delivery protests in 2018, 
accounting for 24 percent more protests than the previous record-holder in 2014”. According 
to Municipal IQ (2019), the Gauteng province occupied the largest spot for “service delivery 
protests between 2004 and 2008, accounting for 24 percent and hitting 36 percent in 2017. 
Conversely, 2018 was entirely different, with the Eastern Cape province leading by 20%”. 
Western Cape province with 17%  comes next and the Gauteng province is seen to be leading 
by 16% (Nyar and Wray, 2012).  
 
The scholars further claim that demonstrations often take place in urban areas, including 
working, “unemployed and homeless, shack dwellers, informal traders, students, local 
populations” and ordinary people whose concerns contribute to socio-economic justice issues 
(Nyar and Wray, 2012). The brutal reaction of the law enforcement officers in countless 
situations, culminating in the injury and death of demonstrators along with guiltless onlookers, 
emphasizes the deep chasm between the government and the metropolitan poor (Beall, Gelb 
and Hassim, 2005). According to Akinboade et al. (2013), Alexander (2010), Hough (2008), 
and Thompson and Nleya (2010), service delivery protests may be aggressive or nonviolent 
with domestic individuals unhappy with the lack of resources offered.  
 
Service delivery demonstrations have shed light on the general dissatisfaction with the civic 
authority system in South Africa (Mathekga & Buccus 2006:13). Scholars also propose that 
service delivery demonstrations are considered a threat to safety as a result of the reluctance of 
elected councillors to supply the communities with sufficient basic services. The government 
is seen to issues false promises and opposing government privatization and private capital 
accumulation practices by crooked local politicians. Thompson and Nleya (2010) claimed that 
insufficient service quality and inadequate transparency, lack of personnel with appropriate 
governance expertise, underfinanced, and the ANC's rollout policies have escalated protests 
over service delivery. The links between local demonstrations and radical activity including 
additional layers of common society are minimal, although this is expected to improve in a 
democratic system (Gumede, 2017). 
 
The new system of governance and legislative agreement for racially diverse areas was built, 
as the new arrangement had to develop quickly in providing the enhanced services expected by 
the people in the new democratic system (Enaifoghe, 2019).  There have been several protests 
actions in South Africa as a result of government failure to deliver the dividend of democracy 
through governance to the people (Enaifoghe and Adetiba, 2019), particularly at the grassroots 
level, such that South Africa is dubbed as "the protest capital of the world" (Rodrigues, 2010).  
 
“One of the highest levels of mass demonstrations in the world is experienced in 
South Africa (Alexander, 2012). It is often argued that the rate of youth-led protests 
has risen since 2004 (Alexander, 2012), but Steven Friedman claims that the latest 
wave of protests dates back to the 1970s (Friedman, 2013)”.  
 
Davids (2012), observed that the protest rate has increased sharply in the first 32 weeks of 
2012, with over 540 confirmed protest cases in the province of Gauteng from April 01 to May 
10, 2013 (Patel, 2013).  
“In February 2014, it was announced that there have been nearly 3,000 protest 
actions in the last 90 days – more than 30 every day – affecting more than one 
million people" (Du Preez, 2014). 
 
It must be noted that over 2 million people protest every year since 2008  (Plaut, 2012). A 
scholar argued that the "widespread service delivery demonstrations could soon take on an 
organizational character that would start as discreet formations and then coalesce into a full-
blown movement" (Ndebele, 2012). Major repression of popular demonstrations has been 
experienced in South Africa due to failed service delivery (Duncan, 2012).  According to 
Moetsi (2015), the most collective grounds for such protest are “urban land and housing 
grievances”. Herskovitz, (2013), indicated that: 
 
"nearly 75% of South Africans aged 20-29 did not vote in the 2011 [local 
government] elections and that "South Africans in that age group were more likely 
to take part in violent street protests against the local ANC than to vote for the 
ruling party".  
 
In September 2013, the police announced that more than 14,000 arrests ++ has been made in 
demonstrations over the last four years" (Evans, 2013). As reported in The Times, “Informal 
settlements have been at the forefront of service delivery protests as residents demand homes 
and basic services” (Dlamini, 2014). During “the 2004/05 financial year, some 6,000 protests 
were officially registered, an undisclosed number of protests went unrecorded, and some 1,000 
protests were unlawfully prohibited” (Dlamini, 2014). This by calculation implies that there 
were at least 15 demonstrations every day in South Africa at this time (FXI, 2011; Losier, 2010; 
Pillay, 2008). Therefore, the total amount of reported service delivery public demonstration 
has risen significantly, and it is estimated that "2009 and 2010 together account for around two-
thirds of all protests since 2004" (Enaifoghe and Adetiba, 2019b; Heese and Allan, n.d).  
 
Immediately after Jacob Zuma first took office, the number of reported confirmed cases of 
failed service delivery was a sensational upsurge in protest, and 2009 protest cases were about 
tenfold higher than in 2004 and even higher in 2010. The protests cases arrived at a record-
breaking high in 2010/2011 (Alexander, 2012) and afterwards a record-breaking high in July 
2012 (Duncan, 2012) with increased public outcry taking place in the Western Cape than in 
any other province (Oryx Media, 2012) and just under half of all protests in shack settlements 
(Marrian, 2012). Research showed a widespread protest reaching its peak since the post-
apartheid era in 1994 by the beginning of 2013 (Stone, 2013). The beginning of 2013 
experienced as many as 3,000 demonstrations (Saba and Merwe, 2013) and has been doubled 
in the last four years (Enaifoghe and Adetiba, 2018). Stone (2013: 8), indicated that “between 
1997 and 2013, most of the demonstrations were linked to workplace problems or crime and 
were rarely disorderly”. 
 
The “total number of protests” declined in 2013, but the “rate of disorderly protests” increased 
significantly (de Wet, 2016). The scholar further highlighted that there were nine out of 11 
peaceful demonstrations (de Wet, 2016). There has been a large degree of repression of 
widespread demonstrations (Duncan, 2011a; Duncan, 2011b; Buccus, 2011).  These 
demonstrations are generally denoted as failed “service delivery protests in the media”, 
however evidence shows an increase in discontent as regards “service delivery” (Benjamin, 
2011). Scholars claim that this “term is too narrow and misleading” as well in its context 
(Pithouse, 2009 and Pithouse, 2011). There are a certain amount of “poor people's movements” 
that maintained their protrusion (Kirshner, 2011), they include the “Unemployed People's 
Movement”. Others, however, have described the “rapidly increasing wave of youth-led 
protests since 2004 as a rebellion of the poor" (Alexander, 2010), while others see it as a “series 
of municipal revolts" (Majavu, 2011).  
 
The increasing rate of popular protests is described by Zwelinzima Vavi, COSATU 
Secretary-General, as a ring of fire, closing down major cities that could lead to a 
Tunisian-style revolution (Mkokeli, 2011; Hassen, 2011).  
 
Some of the most prominent protests during this time have taken place in “Harrismith, Kennedy 
Lane, Durban, Diepsloot, Balfour, Thokoza”, (News24, 2009). Other areas include; “Khutsong, 
Macassar Village, Lansdowne Road (Cape Argus, 2009) and Mandela Park” (Mandela Park, 
2010a and 2010b) in Khayelitsha, KwaZakhele, downtown Durban (Hawker, D. 2010), 
Masiphumelele, Ermelo (de Wet,  n.d), including  Grahamstown and Thembelihle (Lenasia) 
(Duncan, 2011). Public outcry proceeds and certain observers are of believes that outcries are 
becoming extra-extremist (Pillay, 2011). few critics presumed that "a vast majority of South 
Africans believe that traditional methods to engage the state are failing and that alternatives 
can be more effective" (Pillay, 2011). Finally, it is seen from the above literature that many 
scholars and advocates have agreed that “failed service delivery” demonstrations are a piece of 
the prominent uprising of the less privileged. This is a huge uprising to be recorded in a single 
country around the world, with no comparable degree of unrest. Having said that, it safe to 
conclude that South Africa is “the protest capital of the world”. 
 
South African Youth Participation in Democracy: Protest for Good Governance 
The participation of the youth participation in South African protest has been seen as a function 
of democracy and demand for Good Governance. Many Western nations have benefited from 
colonization and racism in the last few decades (Miller 1988; Thornton 1998), utilizing caste 
as an approach to transfer her plot to their territories and institutionalizing servitude to 
accomplish abundance and satisfaction for their kin (Enaifoghe, 2019; Beckert 2014). These 
nations not only colonized Africa and Asia to dominate financial and human resources, but 
they have normalized racial disparity in every sphere of life by basing apartheid on their central 
belief system. As a result, although many colonized countries eventually achieved 
independence, colonial legacies continue to haunt them (Guha 2002; Hountondji 1992). 
 
A distinctive long-lasting adverse implication of this footprint has been the emergence of a 
patriarchal Westernized economic structure controlled by white populations (Hahn 2005; 
Harvey 2005). As a result, Western multinational companies (MNCs) had a secure passage to 
manipulate the everyday lives of exploited colour classes (Onimode, 1978; Chowdhury, 
2019a). Strong players such as government governments, multinational corporations (MNCs), 
first-class non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and Western assistance agencies and 
entities dominate these oppressed communities (Chowdhury, 2019). Powerless 
neighbourhoods, socially disadvantaged working classes, ethnic minorities, and racialized 
populations are examples of vulnerable groups. The powerless populations, socially 
disadvantaged labour classes, religious minorities, and people vulnerable to racial bias and 
prejudice as a result of being trapped within white-dominated capitalist mechanisms are 
examples of oppressed groups.  
 
The Role of South African School Involvement n Protest as Social Change? 
 
In the early years of colonial rule in Africa, young individuals protested in different ways 
against the racial nature of colonization, oppression, and segregation policies known as 
apartheid, especially in South Africa. South Africa's apartheid policies exposed people of 
colour, both young and elderly, to degradation and subordinate status (South African History 
Online, 2019). Schools have been common sites for youngsters to get mindful of the issues 
confronting coloured individuals and to be motivated to orchestrate protests at odds with 
apartheid and the decline of their status since the early twentieth century (SAHO, 1919). These 
early demonstrations were few and had little to do with other school protests occurring all over 
the nation. Before the founding of the African National Youth League in 1945, youth policy 
was carried out in the absence of a national body without a public body to accommodate diverse 
local territories going from rustic to metropolitan regions, as well as a council to tie together 
various schools (SAHO, 2019).  
 
At first sight, school uproar seemed to be largely concerned with interim profit, as well as 
parochial and political problems such as nutritious eating, rules of ethics, and teacher 
harassment. That, though, was not the case. Due to White people’s imprecise along with their 
ignorant views of what coloured people were familiar with, students in boarding schools 
received substandard meals (Girei, 2017). Because of White people's imprecise and ignorant 
views of what Black people were accustomed to, youths (students) in boarding schools received 
very poor quality food (Khan et al, 2007).  
 
These racist stereotypes shaped the bond between students and school officials, reinforcing 
ideas of white superiority and black inferiority. According to a note composed by an understudy 
during those early years, students were aware of South Africa's apartheid practices and the 
government's efforts to replicate these racial policies in classrooms. School strikes were more 
popular and prominent on the political agenda and in the media in the 1920s and beyond. In 
February 1920, the newspapers focused on the first school riot, which was mostly composed 
of young people (Maher, 2018). The end of World War I, as well as the Great Depression of 
1930, exacerbated the situation. There was zero indication that the African students' school 
circumstances were changing. During this period, the majority of education was provided by 
chapels, which were somewhat financially supported by the government. Masika has pointed 
out (2017).  
 
Lack of access to schools has been a major issue in a township like Soweto as a result of African 
youth urbanization. The government was compelled to appoint two commissions of inquiry,  in 
the 40s, due to an increase in school disruptions (Pal, 2016). The administration, on the other 
hand, was unconcerned about the reasons or responses to the school crisis. The two reports 
were never published or followed upon. Then again, the government was anxious that the new 
syllabus could produce "Black supremacists." In terms of faith, the government was frequently 
dismissive of "Christian ethics taught by sects other than Afrikaner denominations, such as the 
Dutch Reformed Church" (Rosenthal, 2018). The Afrikaner National Party won the general 
election in 1948, however, announced its intention to overhaul South Africa's school system 
for coloured citizens. In February 1949, the government formed a commission of inquiry 
chaired by Dr. W. W. M. Eiselen to investigate how African-American education could be 
modified to address requirements as a free race (SAHO, 2019).  
 
The Commission recommended that the government create coloured Municipal Councils to 
regulate Black citizens' education (SAHO, 2014). In rustic regions where there were local 
officials (chiefs), traditional rulers and officials were given control and authority over 
education. The aim was to halt Black people's schooling at the "expense" of white people. 
According to Varman and Al-Amoudi (2016), the government believed that African American 
citizens should bear the financial burden of Black schooling. However, the Bantu Education 
Act was passed in 1953, which redirected the responsibility of colored education to the 
Department of Native Affairs and established the government's financial contribution at R13-
000-000 (SAHO, 2019). Above this figure, Black people would have to share (Chowdhury, 
2019a). Dr. Verwoerd claimed the following year: 
 
“when I have charge of Native Education, I will turn it so that Natives will be 
taught from childhood to know that equality with Europeans is not for them ... 
People who believe in equality are not desirable teachers for them, as my 
Department regulates education, it will know for what class of higher education a 
Native is fitted, and whether he will have a chance to use his experience in life”. 
(Dr. Verwoerd  was the then Minister of Native Affairs), 
 
To what essence is mathematics taught to a Bantu child if they will never use it? That is thought 
to be absurd. It was now clear that inferior education for Black citizens was a matter of strategy, 
and that the government would be driving endeavours to build up a racial oppressor society 
(Chowdhury, 2019a). Furthermore, the African National Congress (ANC) proved to be too frail 
to mount a meaningful threat to government policies. It orchestrated a national strike, which 
was quickly suppressed by government attempts to oust all students who skipped school or 
were associated with a blacklist.  
 
The youth movements began to take shape again in the 1970s thereby causing social change. 
The youth protests in rural regions of Lebowa, Northern Transvaal, Transkei, and Ciskei turned 
brutal when the school land was burnt to ashes by students. Students have been convicted and 
given court penalties such as fines or corporal punishment (SAHO, 2014). Moroka High School 
in Thaba Nchu has devolved into a battleground. Students became unhappy with the gradual 
lack of educational freedom and increased government control of the school curriculum in both 
of these protests. "The government directed the Department of Education to teach half of all 
subjects in Standard Five in Afrikaans" near the end of 1975. (SAHO, 2019). This teaching 
was met with immediate resistance from parents and colleges. At the beginning of 1976, the 
Soweto Schools have been in a state of revolt. In June, several schools banded together in 
protests that culminated in the notorious June 16 rebellion. Youth Politics in South Africa, 
1976-16 June (Chowdhury, 2019a). 
 
South African Youth Organization’s Participation in Protest 
South African youth had organized themselves to participate in protest during the 1970s, it was 
regarded as the watershed for youth policy in the country. From campus to campus, the South 
African Student Organization (SASO) was attracting favour. Their exercises were more 
extremist and aggressively opposed to apartheid law and racial oppressor rule in summary 
(Maher, 2018). During this time, SASO seemed sure enough to communicate its diplomatic 
message to secondary school students. Notwithstanding, it stayed a wary methodology with the 
restricted objective of preparing youthful scholastics for guidance in the Black community. 
Nonetheless, the national climate was charged with opposition to campaigns and practices that 
appeared to reinforce the Black inferiority complex. 
 
In 1972, the Black People's Convention (BPC) was founded to unite people of colour and 
conduct the Black Consciousness approach. The number of scholars and colleges in townships 
around the country has increased. This resulted in a rapid concentration of youth in townships 
in schools. Youth networks have evolved to be even more complex. Youth politics has taken a 
confrontational stand against the racial segregation regime in public. The early Manifestos of 
the Congress of South African Students, on the other hand, centred fundamentally around 
student issues such as school tuition the utilization of whipping, and an absence of 
incorporation in school administering bodies (Maher, 2018). These were not insignificant 
issues at the time, whereas South Africa's education system was built on a firm discipline 
system along with a conservative agenda (Girei, 017). The 1976 uprising heightened students' 
political mindfulness and ignited a reestablished articulation of youth empowerment and an 
attempt to change their environmental factors, beginning with classrooms. 
 
The South African Student Association has been the umbrella organization representing 
various school groups leading up to the June 16 rebellion since the early 1970s. However, the 
technique was limited to Soweto and no significant attempt was made to create a national body 
(Pal, 2016). The youth argued that as local advocates and responders to the call to wage war 
against the establishment, they were supported in making an immediate move against those 
who were behaving against them or the community as a whole. Since South Africa's return to 
democracy in 1994, public demonstrations against service delivery, undemocratic rules, or land 
allocation have become an integral part of society, especially since 2004, when the country's 
democracy was ten years old. The second decade of independence saw an uptick in street 
protests and armed brutality reminiscent of the anti-apartheid movement. 
 
The police have estimated that over 500 protests have taken place in Gauteng alone since the 
beginning of 2014, with over 100 of them turning violent. Some of the protests turned brutal, 
bringing about death, property harm, and plundering. The death of  Andries Tatane, a protester, 
on 13 April 2011 during a demonstration service in the Free State of Ficksburg, reportedly at 
the hands of eight police officers, was the most highly publicized. In August 2012, 34 workers 
were killed as a result of a strike at the Marikana mine in Amplats, North West. In October 
2013, protesters in Cape Town split away from the group and began plundering stalls and shops 
in St George's Mall, provoking storekeepers and merchants to pack their things inspired by fear 
of being assaulted by the crowd (Chowdhury, 2019a). This paper discovers a connection 
between conflict in South Africa and its effect on citizenship and governance.  
 
It is crucial to objectively explore the implications of relying on 'community as a way of 
countering youth-led activism, as well as how it can better counter the unity and cultural 
traditions that bring the conflict to life. These real styles of society in the post-apartheid era 
may contradict the government's attempts to unify the country, resulting in balkanized areas of 
government practice mapped into spatially distinct networks of a life controlled by racialized 
risk and mortality estimates. 
The Effective use of Protests in a Democratic System as a catalyst for social change 
The fundamental feature of youth engagement in politics is the large investment by a new group 
of warriors, comprising exclusively jobless youth as well as school students. This is on the 
surface of youth activism regarding citizen demand for good governance and service delivery 
in the face of callous, self-serving, and incompetent elected officials The Afrobarometer poll, 
conducted in 2016, to assess whether or not Autonomy is still wanted by Africans, concluded 
that the Most Africans wanted democracy and rebuked any form of dictatorship 
(Afrobarometer, 2016). Anyway, it was discovered that the fortification of the majority rules 
system is dwindling, by all accounts part of a worldwide example (Gumede, 2017). Scholars 
believe that nations become fit through democracy. 
 
According to Amartya Sen, “the challenge to facilitate a positive evolution in practice and 
commitment to democracy, using innovative approaches, remains the more important” (Sen, 
1999).  In majority rule government and 'dissent' distinctively summons the pictures of a defiant 
minority that are taking a general viewpoint, as in meetings against specific conflicts or bars 
against the logging of a rainforest (Martin, 1994). Youth participation and effective adoption 
of protests in a democracy are seen as a catalyst for social change as well as just as they are 
fundamental for resident cooperation in a pluralistic democracy.  As noted by the Open Society 
Justice Initiative (2019), protests “enable individuals and groups to share their views and 
interests, express dissent, and make demands of the government for good governance or other 
institutions”.  
 
However, more or less few Law enforcement officials and civil servants view protest as a 
nuisance, an interruption that needs to be controlled, while others treat it as a threat that needed 
to be extinguished (Committee on the Administration of Justice, 2018). a portion of the 
difficulties encountered by the social orders is guaranteeing the option to gather and dispatch 
a legitimate dissent. In a situation in which protesters are protected from unfair or unjust 
treatment, police officers are trained to adequately conduct protests, and the use of force during 
demonstrations is monitored (CAJ, 2018). Protests are often affiliated with movements that are 
unconventional and lack inside relations with those in positions of authority. According to 
Martin (1994), the opposition is often 'against' anything or other, an effort to halt a procedure 
or activity that would otherwise go unquestioned. Most people equate demonstrators with the 
rabble in the streets.  
 
Booth (2011) noted that “although the vast majority of protest activity in liberal democracies 
is nonviolent in reality and intent, an aura of actual or potential violence commonly 
accompanies media presentations and popular perceptions of protest”. These images are part 
of a larger picture that weighs the 'right to dissent against the need for 'peace and order' 
(Grindle, 2010). The conformist media portrayal of opposition by governments and scholars 
(Mauss, 1975) generally centres around political activity by a specific part of the populace. 
Protest acts by members of the public are thought to be controversial, whereas other 
government processes are thought to be less so (Momoh, 2015). To get a deeper or broader 
perspective on what is often referred to as dissent, it is important to make a stride back and 
inspect the entire environment. Enaifoghe (2019), articulated that “the dominant political actors 
that are in liberal democracies are the state”, establishments as well as the professions. The 
routine activities that are usually held by these players, tend to establish the society's ongoing 
political and economic structure such as in South Africa.  
Concluding Remark 
The young people in South Africa have shown an enthusiastic need for a Government that 
responds to their needs like quality education, good and affordable health care facilities, jobs, 
and other equitable components of service delivery. They have become disillusioned, restless,  
L}and frustrated for change. Particularly, towards the state of leadership and the quality of 
service delivery in the country and this has been evidenced through series of protests. The 
youths have realized what is expected of the government to do and they seek to drive the 
government into doing better. The notion that government knows what citizens want is long 
outdated. Thus, there is a need to modernize and rethink policies to encourage greater 
participation and ensure that all citizens are fully represented particularly the youths. Likewise, 
youths should constitute an integral component of processes such as constitutionalism, rule of 
law, and electoral processes in Africa. 
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